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FROM THE BEGINNING, A FUNDAMENTAL
SHIFT OF PARADIGMS: A THEORY
AND SHORT HISTORY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Zygmunt JB. Plater*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Looking back on the past twenty-five years, during which environmental law has developed such astonishing breadth, depth, and volume, I
think it possible to sketch out an interesting compound proposition about
how environmental law evolved, the primacy of citizen litigation in its
development, and what it all may signify.
How is it that environmental law has in short order built such a
large body of law, covering so many diverse subjects and infiltrating itself
throughout the prior existing legal system, as well as creating new law? I
propose that it is because environmental law has been riding a wave of
structural change formed by the conjunction of two fundamental paradigm shifts in American society. The proposition has two parts.
First, the basic analytical approach and policy values underlying environmental law came from a fundamental paradigm shift born of Rachel
Carson in 1961, perhaps assisted unwittingly by Ronald Coase, redefining the scope of how societal governance decisions should be made.'

o

1994 by Zygmunt J.B. Plater.
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. A fuller version of this Essay and some
overall analyses and conclusions drawn from the proposition presented here, can be found in
Zygmunt J.B. Plater, EnvironmentalLaw as a Mirrorof the Future-Tracingthe Consequences
of a Fundamental Shift of Paradigms,22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. (forthcoming 1994). I
much appreciate the time that my colleagues Rob Abrams, Carolyn Alkire, Harry Bader, John
Kelleher, John Morrier, Pat Ratkowski, and Bill Shutkin have given me, good-naturedly putting up with brainstorming sessions and trying to correct the Essay's most egregious errors.
They bear no blame, however, for deficiencies that remain.
1. Rachel Carson's Silent Spring was arguably the most important single trigger of the
environmental great awakening, the scientific treatise that brought ecological consciousness
into the American mainstream. See RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).

Professor

Ronald Coase's The Problem of Social Cost, although a paean to market ordering, served to
popularize recognition of social cost externalizations. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). Welfare economics presumes that individuals are
powerfully motivated to externalize costs as much as possible, and cost externalizations have
long been the prime targets for environmental law's accounting process. Id.
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What we might call the Rachel Carson Paradigm2 declared that,

although humans naturally try to maximize their own accumulation of
benefits and ignore negative effects of their actions, a society that wishes
to survive and prosper must identify and take comprehensive account of

the real interacting consequences of individual decisions, negative as well
as positive, whether the marketplace accounts for them or not. Attempts

to achieve such expanded accountings, as much as anything, have been
the common thread linking the remarkable range of issues that we call
environmental law.

Rachel Carson's logic is practical, utilitarian advice. Not to heed it,
allowing private and public enterprises to act as if they are unconnected
islands, where out of sight is out of mind, means that a society risks a
short- and long-term shipwreck on the shoals of its own detritus-not
just an accumulation of toxics, but also a host of other social costs and
unintended consequences.'
A second, structural paradigm shift from the mid-1960s has also
been critically important to the formation of American environmental
law: the shift in the structure of governance from a bipolar, Market/
Regulatory Government Paradigm to a multipolar, actively Pluralist
Model.' Environmental law has been, and had to be, predominantly created and shaped by active citizens, operating from positions outside official private and public governing institutions.
The Rachel Carson Paradigm and environmental consciousness fortuitously hit America at the same moment as this second paradigm shift.
If the utilitarian message of the Carson analytical construct was to be
2. See infra text accompanying note 66. It alternatively and more awkwardly might be
called the Holistic Interconnected-Accounting Paradigm in honor of the First Law of Ecology:
Everything is connected to everything else.
Just as others, such as John Muir, had foreshadowed Carson's ecological arguments, the
logic of comprehensive societal accounting was a familiar theme in the work of John Dewey
and the pragmatists, as well as an underlying premise of welfare economics.
Indeed, the Rachel Carson Paradigm is obvious, virtually a truism. Truism or not, however, it was generally ignored as a functional societal policy. Carson's formulation, however,
had broad popular and political impact and instantly clicked with a wide range of people who
wanted to take action in the field that came to be known as environmentalism. Perhaps the
environmental problems she identified were more tangible, directly related to things people
saw around them. Perhaps her formulation made coherent critical analysis available to more
people and offered more coherent prescriptive corrections. Perhaps it just came at the right
time. And insofar as the identification of the Carson Paradigm is itself a truism, it seems to be
one that usefully deserves more attention in ongoing analysis of environmental fact and policy.
3. Or, in welfare economics terms, unaccounted, externalized costs lead to society-wide
suboptimal results.
4. Looking for a patronymic label, I suppose one could call this the "Thomas JeffersonMao Tse-Tung-Let A Hundred Flowers Bloom-Pluralist Paradigm," but under the circumstances perhaps it is just as well to say the Pluralist Paradigm.
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carried into the society's long-term perspective and the structures of government, reorienting the way decisions are made, it was not to be expected that the old bipolar establishments of the status quo would
welcome it-nor have they. A diverse array of interests, most of which
are "outsiders," had to thrust it into the legal system. More than any
other area of the modern legal system, environmental law has developed
its complex, extended, doctrinal structure in a process dependent upon
confrontational, pluralistic citizen activism, operating in every area of
governance, but particularly in judicial and administrative litigation.
Although one should not be oblivious to some caveats-environmental law can be chaotic and wasteful, citizens did not do it all, and so
on 5-this compound analytical and structural proposition helps explain
why the field of environmental law has been so energetic, broad-ranging,
and often confrontational. It also explains where environmental law may
be going.

II. A

DIAGNOSTIC EXAMPLE: SECTION 318(G) OF THE 1990
INTERIOR APPROPRIATIONS ACT

Here is one recent artifact of environmental law's evolutionary prothat reflects many classic elements of environmental confrontation
and provides illustration and analytical grist for the proposition. Section
318(g) of the Department of Interior and Related Agencies Appropriacess6

5. To assert citizen primacy runs the risk of ignoring the protracted and sometimes heroic efforts of hundreds of people within the nation's legislatures, administrative agencies, and
corporate institutions who undeniably have been extremely important in shaping the substance
and character of evolving doctrines of environmental law. But a review of the history of environmental law shows grounds for asserting that without insistent citizen activism, this process
of law building would probably never have happened or would have died aborning. The development of environmental law is especially significant for the process by which it has occurred
as well as the importance of its subject matter.
A further caveat is that environmentalists have certainly not been consistently triumphant; environmental law is not an exact mirror of their heart-felt desires. Modem public and
private law environmental doctrines contain reams of counterweights, balancings, and bluntings of the environmentalists' protective principles and arguments. And "environmentalists,"
for that matter, are anything but a homogeneous monolith; they include a remarkable biodiversity of individuals and groups.
6. Like several other elements of this Essay, the example that follows is drawn in part
from the Author's recently published casebook, ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: A COURSEBOOK ON NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 572-74, 67483 (1992) [hereinafter NLS] (addressing Department of Interior and Related Agencies Act,
Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 318(g), 103 Stat. 701, 749 (1989) (codified in scattered titles of
U.S.C.)). In compiling that book it appeared to us that the only way to make sense of the
colossally complex morass that is modem environmental law was to study it as an activistdriven creation, the result of an evolutionary process incorporating the new perspectives of
environmental analysis into the entire legal system. Faced with the chronic hesitations of the
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tions Act for fiscal 1990, 7 which subsequently appeared in several other
annual funding bills, states that

[n]o restraining order or preliminary injunction shall be issued
by any court of the United States with respect to any decision

to prepare, advertise, offer, award, or operate.., timber sales in
fiscal year 1990 from the thirteen national forests in Oregon
and Washington and Bureau of Land Management lands in
western Oregon known to contain northern spotted owls. The
provisions of section 705 of title 5, United States Code [author-

izing courts to stay agency actions], shall not apply to any challenge to such a timber sale: Provided, That the courts shall

have authority to [issue permanent injunctions for timber sales
found to be] arbitrary, capricious or otherwise not in accordance with law ....

I

What is going on here? This appropriations rider is a legislative axestroke from the pitched battles over the clear-cutting of the last remain-

ing stands of old-growth forests on the federal lands of the Pacific
Northwest.

On one side stand the advocates of a massive, final program of clearcutting-the timber industry and its close ally, the United States Forest
official players in the law-making system, environmental law was built by attorneys and activists using every available nook and cranny of the existing legal process.
This comprehensive, citizen-oriented legal process analysis of environmental law appears
to have merit. A recent American Association of Law Schools workshop was launched in
recognition of the pervasive legal process reach of the field, noting the extraordinary array of
areas in the legal system in which environmental law has recently provided a cutting edge:
administrative law, land use and natural resources, bankruptcy, criminal law, law and economics, insurance, local government, real property, torts, civil procedure, civil rights, corporations,
constitutional law, ethics, jurisprudence, legal history, remedies, tax, international and comparative law, trusts, land finance, public utilities, poverty law, labor and occupational health,
contracts, food and drug law, alternative dispute resolution processes, and more. These issues
were discussed at the 1994 American Association of Law Schools Annual Meeting Mini Workshop, entitled Environmental Issues Across the Curriculum, in Orlando, Florida, on January
6, 1994.
7. Pub. L. No. 101-121, 103 Stat. 701, 749 (1989) (codified in scattered titles of U.S.C.)
[hereinafter Appropriations Act]. Other provisions of this appropriations rider, no longer on
the books, required the agencies to sell off increased annual quotas of timber, id. § 318(a)(1),
103 Stat. at 745, restricted the cutting of certain ecologically significant old-growth forest
stands except as necessary to meet the sales quota, id. § 318(b)(2), 103 Stat. at 746, directed the
Forest Service to prepare a new spotted owl plan and have it in place by September 30, 1990,
id. § 318(b)(6)(B), 103 Stat. at 747, insulated from judicial review Forest Service and Bureau of
Land Management decisions shown to be based on outdated information, id. § 318(b)(6)(A),
103 Stat. at 747, and made quasi-judicial findings to reverse two injunctions against timbercutting, id. The latter were held valid in an opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas in Robertson v.
Seattle Audubon Society, 112 S. Ct. 1407, 1409 (1992).
8. Apppropriations Act, § 318(g)(1), 103 Stat. at 749.

April 1994]

SHIFT OF PARADIGMS

Service, the designated federal guardian of these public lands, backed by
local congressional delegations. This side represents the center of gravity, money, and power on this issue.

On the other side stand "the environmentalists," a typical, motley
collection of citizen volunteers: fishers, college students, aging hippies,

retired foresters, ecologists, homemakers, bird watchers and other nature
lovers, a few brave and foolhardy employees within the ranks of the industry and the Forest Service (including the remarkably courageous As-

sociation of Forest Service Employees for Environmental Ethics
(AFSEEE)), other public citizens, and several post-Rachel Carson non-

governmental organizations (NGOs) dedicated to environmental advocacy and legal action.9 This side is largely comprised of volunteers and

amateurs with severely limited resources and, at least until recently, little
acknowledged legitimacy or hope of success.
Looking at the results of federal timber policy over the years, the
citizen environmentalists argued not only that the industry, having eliminated most of the remaining virgin stands of Northwest forest in private

hands, was on the verge of finishing off the precious last and most fragile
of the public's old-growth forests, but also that in societal terms it made
neither ecological nor economic sense to do so.
Clear-cutting devastates forests, forever destroying the stable and
rich biodiversity that they have developed over eons.'° It can have dev-

astating direct and indirect economic consequences as well.
After a forested slope is clear-cut, the surface soils and lumbering

detritus wash downgrade, where transient debris dams create flash-flooding dangers, and sediments choke the streams. Clear-cut sedimentation
9. Among the citizen organizations that mounted the old-growth ancient forests protection campaign were the national and local Audubon societies, Trout Unlimited, the Oregon
Natural Resources Council, the University of Oregon Northwest Environmental Clinic, Lou
Gold and the Siskiyou Regional Education Project, the Project Lighthawk Environmental
Airforce, the Association of Forest Service Employees for Environmental Ethics, the Headwaters advocacy group, the Pacific Rivers Council, the Native Forests Council, the Sierra Club
Legal Defense Fund, and the Earth Island Institute.
10. I am assuming, not-so-arguendo, the basic sense of the environmentalists' arguments.
Clear-cutting involves the elimination of virtually all trees and shrub vegetation in a forest,
with piles of unwanted leftover "slash" burned off to prepare the way for a tree-farming,
"even-age," single-species monoculture. The previous ecological equilibrium of the forest
ends, with the variety of natural animal and plant species dropping from hundreds per acre to
mere tens or less. The erosion, water temperature, and water budget consequences of the
clear-cutting are felt far from the site. The regrown tree farms are less useful for public use,
more susceptible to disease, and despite the public relations claims of the past 40 years, apparently are insufficiently fertile to provide a sustainable timber resource. See 5 RICHARD RICE,
THE WILDERNESS Soc'Y, NATIONAL FORESTS: POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE, THE UNCOUNTED COSTS OF LOGGING (1989).
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and debris runoff has been a major cause of recent precipitous declines in
the Pacific salmon fisheries by smothering or scouring fish-spawning

habitat, and have reduced reservoir storage capacity and hydroelectric
generation. These costs are hard to quantify, but are real nevertheless.II

Job statistics provide a rough cross-industry comparison of relative impacts: The stressed Pacific Northwest fisheries in 1991 still provided jobs
for approximately 6000 fishers-drastically diminished from the years
before extensive logging and dam building-half again as many as in the
clear-cutting workforce in the same region at the same time. 12

Then there is the economic fact that federal taxpayers massively
subsidize this dysfunctional program. Federal taxpayers subsidize the
timber industry in four major ways. The Forest Service (in ascending
order)

(1) sells timber from national forests below regular market
3

price;1

11. E.g., Michael Stewartt, A Chain Saw Massacre in Our Forests, CHI. TRIB., June 20,
1992, at C21. There is general agreement in the salmon industry that the drastic fall in the
salmon catch in the Pacific Northwest-less than half of that caught just three years ago-has
been caused by the combination of clear-cutting and continued burdens on migration routes by
federal dams. The south fork of the Salmon River used to be the most important steelhead and
salmon stream in Idaho until it was wiped out by a U.S. Forest Service-sponsored clear-cut.
The cash value of the timber was estimated at about $14 million; the state and federal governments subsequently estimated the value of the lost salmonids in terms of economic return at
$100 million. FLY ROD & REEL MAG., Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 19.
12. CAROLYN ALKIRE, THE WILDERNESS SOC'Y, WILD SALMON AS NATURAL CAPITAL.
ACCOUNTING FOR SUSTAINABLE USE (1993) (citing W.A. WILCOX, NOTES ON THE FISHERIES OF THE PACIFIC COAST IN 1899 (1902)); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTY BUSINESS PATTERNS tbl. I(B) (1993) (noting that 6136 total commercial fishers, hunters, and
trappers in Oregon, Washington, and California, overwhelmingly comprised of fishers); H.
MICHAEL ANDERSON & JEFFREY T. OLSON, FEDERAL FORESTS AND THE ECONOMIC BASE
OF THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST (1992); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1992, at 673; 1991 U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. REP. OF THE U.S.
FOREST SERV. Based on industry workforce reports, it has been calculated that selective logging practices provide roughly twice as many jobs per forest acre than the more mechanized
clear-cutting process. Telephone Interview with Tim Hermach, Executive Director, Native
Forest Council (Feb. 28, 1994).
Total steelhead, salmon, and char economic revenues in the Pacific Northwest, excluding
Alaska, in the late 1980s totalled approximately $1.25 billion annually. The industry as a
whole supports 62,750jobs. This fishery is currently about one-tenth its historic size. PACIFIC
RIVERS COUNCIL, INC., RESEARCH REP. No. V, THE ECONOMIC IMPERATIVE OF PROTECTING RIVERINE HABITAT IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 10 (1992). The total value of the commercial salmonid harvest each year in the 1980s was approximately $233 million. Id. at 7.
13. The Forest Service sets its auction base price with reference to the average potential
buyer, rather than the normal appraisal standard-the price that would be paid by a willing
buyer to a willing private market seller. See Robert E. Wolf, NationalForest Timber Sales and
the Legacy of Gifford Pinchot: Managing a Forest and Making It Pay, 60 U. COLO. L. REV.
1037, 1065 n.157 (1989).
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(2) spends several hundred million dollars per year building
and maintaining logging roads in rugged terrain-to date the
Forest Service has built seven times more road mileage than the
entire interstate highway system-and providing other free
services to the industry. In many cases the timber itself is sold
below the government's own out-of-pocket cash-flow costs.
From 1979 to 1991 the Forest Service sold 124 billion board
14
feet at a loss of $3.5 billion;
(3) pays twenty-five percent of gross timber receipts as grants
to local communities in lieu of property taxes;'" and
(4) as noted above, fails to account for the largest subsidy of
all: ecological costs, including the loss of salmon runs, the permanent sacrifice of thousands of acres of diverse natural forests,
often on fragile, high-elevation, steep slopes that otherwise
public uses, as well
would be available for multiple, nonlogging
16
concerns.
aesthetic
and
as ethical
In other words the environmental position in the old-growth clearcutting controversy, as in so many environmental battles, is that if you
do a rational overall economic and ecological analysis weighing the program's real benefits 17 against all the real costs, in light of available alternatives,' 8 the net rational decision for society is to do it differently: End
the subsidized old-growth clear-cutting. This is a conclusion supported
by hardheaded economists outside the industry and the Forest Service, as
14. If interest is figured in, this is a net loss of $6.3 billion. In addition to providing logging roads, the Forest Service also' surveys and inventories timberlands, provides fire protection, staff personnel and structures, creates maps, and controls disease. Under cost-accounting
analysis most of the 122 national forests have never earned a penny on timber, and in 1990
only 15 showed a cash-flow profit. Wolf, supra note 13, at 1074-75; Perri Knize, The Mismanagement of the NationalForests, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 1991, at 98, 101, 103; BELOWCOST TIMBER SALES TASK FORCE, SOCIETY OF AM. FORESTERS, A QUESTION OF VALUES:
BELOW-COST TIMBER SALES ON THE NATIONAL FORESTS (1988) (arguing that recreational
benefits of logging roads and similar positive effects justify below-cost timber sales).
15. In 1990 this amounted to $327 million. The theory of these payments is that the federal government ought to contribute because it is exempt from state and local property taxation. The Forest Service does not reckon these and many other public costs against revenues in
figuring net revenues. Knize, supra note 14, at 103.
16. See Tom Barlow, Evolution of the NationalForestManagement Act of 1976, 8 ENVTL.
L. 539, 543-44 (1978); Steve Young, Tree Slaughter: Your Taxes at Work, WASH. POST, Aug.
13, 1989, at B3.
17. Examples of such alternatives include logging profits, continuation of some logging
jobs, and local logging settlements' way of life at least over the short term.
18. These include elimination of subsidies, disincentives against exports of unprocessed
logs, selective cutting, long-term sustainable management, and retraining for loggers.
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well as authoritative international resource analysts,1 9 and would seem at
least to have deserved some serious consideration in the public forum.

Without environmental litigation, however, there would have been
virtually no effective public debate. The official players in the timber
arena, both governmental and corporate, had no interest in acknowledg-

ing the clear-cutting program's negative consequences or making a realistic overall economic, much less ecological, assessment of the program.20
The "Iron Triangle" formed by the regulated industry, its regulators in

the bureaucracy, and the local congressional delegation,21 had been
molded into a powerful onrolling status quo, each enjoying its own intricate system of rewards that flowed from maintaining clear-cutting policies without acknowledging costs to the public and the national legacy.

The industry gets its free roads and below-cost public timber. The Forest
Service gets its "stumpage" measure of production to show performance

of its politically perceived mission and the political cachet that goes with
it, and some federal officials will eventually take the revolving door into a
second career in the timber industry. The industry's congressional
spokespersons get the strategic rewards of satisfying large local economic
interests and campaign contributors. In the economic terms of rational

individual maximization of self-interest, each found it advantageous to
ignore the diffuse social costs of the clear-cutting regime. Because public
forests cost nothing to create-and ecosystem damages are hard to account for because they are extremely diffuse, partly aesthetic, and gener19. WORLD FORESTS FOR THE FUTURE: THEIR USE AND CONSERVATION

(Kilaparti

Ramakrishna & George Woodwell eds., 1993); WORLD COMM'N ON ENV'T AND DEV., OUR
COMMON FUTURE 136-37 (1987) [hereinafter OUR COMMON FUTURE]. At the Rio Summit
world leaders signed the Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus of the Management,
Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests. The Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, 31 I.L.M. 882 (1992).
20. Why did environmental regulatory agencies like the state and federal fish and wildlife
services fail to intervene to force consideration of the destructive effects of clear-cutting? To
observers of environmental politics, that is a naive question because protective agencies have so
long been politically outgunned, suborned, repressed, or co-opted by the resource-exploitation
establishment, which includes rival sister agencies as well as industry and its legislative allies.
See, eg., NLS, supra note 6, at 608 (noting that state and federal conservation agencies are
willing but unable to protect watersheds being channelized by United States Soil Conservation
Service).
21. The term "Iron Triangle" appears to have been used originally by Professor Bruce
Hannon at the University of Illinois and the Coalition for American Rivers in the late 1960s in
efforts to resist the water resources pork barrel. The term has useful descriptive application in
a wide variety of agency-industry settings. The blocs depicted in the old-growth clear-cutting
controversy are replicated in the grazing, mining, and agricultural subsidy arenas and roughly
paralleled in the pollution control wars.
Somewhat confusingly, of course, under the rubric being used here, the bipolar paradigm
often leads to Iron Triangles. Go figure.
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ally difficult to quantify 22 -the official players could safely externalize
these costs while internalizing their own slices of the economic and polit-

ical profits. In our present system no official entity has the fail-safe operational task of making sure that agencies comply with laws and that

governmental programs make overall sense.
The citizens who spoke for the trees, the ecosystem, and the overall
social-cost accounting initially could find no place in the public policy

forum. Citizen environmentalists had no expertise, it was argued; this
was a field for professionals. If they did find professionals willing to
speak for the overview, these voices would be dismissed as disgruntled
mavericks. In other cases the environmentalists have been straightforwardly excluded as gratuitous self-appointed interlopers, with no official
stake in the matter. In the press as well as the corridors of power, environmentalists are often treated as marginal gadflies, at least until they get

an injunction.
Since a straightforward public debate on federal clear-cutting pro-

grams was not possible, the public-interest citizens could either go home
or go to court. As in so many other tough issues, they chose the latter

with all its burdens.
In a lineup of legal claims that reflects the heritage and battle plan of
a typical environmental law campaign,23 the citizens filed lawsuits

against the clear-cutting program alleging violations of a variety of statutes that consciously or unwittingly incorporated Carson-style account-

ings: Forest Service timber sales were alleged to be in violation of the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA),2 4 which requires
federal agencies to do some comprehensive looking before leaping; the
National Forest Management Act of 1976,2" which is supposed to require
22. A fundamental problem in many environmental cases is that there is no ready market
in the legacy value of resources or quality of life. Environmental law is again pioneering innovative methods of resource accounting to cure this deficit. See NLS, supra note 6, at 56-57,
166-68. But even where cash dollar values are available to demonstrate the overall economic
preferability of the environmental position, official decision makers, who after all live in their
own internalized benefit-cost contexts, still regularly go against optimal social choices. See
Zygmunt J.B. Plater, In the Wake of the Snail Darter: An EnvironmentalLaw Paradigm and
Its Consequences, 19 U. MicH. J.L. REFORM 805, 814-18 (1986) (noting that pork-barrel regulars overrode unanimous cabinet-level economic verdict that contended project was worth far
less than river valley and ecosystem it would destroy).
23. Unlike many major environmental law cases, however, the old-growth forest cases do
not appear to have included nonstatutory causes of action. In many other cases, like the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the common law has continued to provide a sophisticated, flexible, practical environmental litigation platform.
24. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-4370d (West 1985 & Supp. 1993).
25. Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16
U.S.C.).
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effective overall official planning, taking account of a broad swath of pub-

lic concerns in the public forests; the Federal Oregon and California
Railroad Land Grant Act;26 the Migratory Bird Treaty Act;2 7 the Fed-

eral Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA);28 the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA);29 and others. 30 None of these legal

vehicles required an overall rational public cost-benefit analysis of the
clear-cutting program. 3 To varying degrees, however, each offered some

purchase on the problem, especially after the not-coincidental discovery
that the ecological qualities of the last old-growth forests were intimately
linked to the fate of the endangered Northern spotted owl, Strix occidentalis caurina.32

Most of these statutes incorporated some elements of the Carson
Paradigm's expanded accounting perspective. They also owed their

existence to the pluralism of outsider citizens. Some had key provisions
drafted by citizens.3 3 All had been made into effective law, not by official
26. 43 U.S.C. § 1181g (1988).
27. 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1988).
28. 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-1784 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993).
29. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). This Act, in effect, casts endangered
species in the role of sensitive backup triggers for mandatory substantive official response in
situations where other planning and protective systems have failed.
30. For example, the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-668ee (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992), although not the basis of litigation, was useful in requiring interagency surveying of consequential effects upon fish and wildlife. The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), was utilized to probe administrative processes and the plaintiffs
even considered filing civil RICO suits against the federal officials whose obstruction of statutory compliance is evidenced in Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans, 771 F. Supp. 1081, 1089-91
(W.D. Wash. 1991). See NLS, supra note 6, at 674-84.
Different statutes aim at different stages of the administrative process. The Endangered
Species Act, for instance, too often comes inefficiently late in the game, at the end of project
planning. Secretary Bruce Babbitt has emphasized that the better long-term strategy is foresight planning to avoid endangerment in the first place. Habitat loss is a primary cause of
endangerment, so land-based economic controversies will predictably continue.
31. There is not, and probably never will be, a Federal Prevention of Destructive Subsidized Giveaways Act.
32. It is not coincidental that many endangered species exist as vivid ecological indicators--canaries in the coal mines-of places and resources that are endangered and valuable to
humans as well. The leading cause of endangerment is habitat destruction, and when a highly
specialized species no longer has sufficient places to live and breed, that means such places are
being lost to humans as well. The important timber cases are chronicled in Victor M. Sher,
Travels with Strix: The Spotted Owl's Journey through the Federal Courts, 14 PUB. LAND L.
REV. 41 (1993).
33. The only teeth in NEPA, the environmental impact statement requirements, derived
from Professor Lynton Caldwell's draft language; § 7 of the Endangered Species Act apparently was drafted by Tom Garrett, then at Friends of the Earth, and Frank Potter. The
FLPMA was forged from extensive public participation in the Public Lands Review Commission hearings.
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governmental implementation but rather by relentless and sophisticated
citizen litigation in courts and agency proceedings.3 g
It was not until the citizens had won preliminary injunctions in several of these cases that the official players and the press began to take
them seriously as participants in the public policy debate. For the press,
our governing information system, 3 5 injunctions were news that legitimized coverage of the environmentalist combatants' side of the story. As
for the official players, they were stung-not into compliance but into
extensive counterattacks. The citizens who were proving that federal
conservation statutes were being violated were branded as dangerous
radicals, attacking the American system. The defendants attempted to
get the environmentalists' attorneys disbarred, to have the environmental
law clinic that had brought several cases disbanded, and to have the law
professors supervising student efforts censured by their university. Employees within the Forest Service and the industry were fired, demoted,
transferred, or suffered similar reprisals for failing to tailor data to fit
official needs, and internal sources of leaked information were energetically pursued. 36 The so-called Wise Use movement, another in a series of
industry-spawned "public interest" organizations, 37 produced vituperative media attacks on the owl and old-growth forest advocates. 38 Each
34. See infra notes 78-89 and accompanying text.
35. Day in and day out it seems to many participants in national policy debates that it is
not what government actually knows, but what the press perceives and transmits to the public
that shapes government policy. In the snail darter-Tellico dam battle, the Secretary of Interior
himself conveyed the God Committee's unanimous economic findings against the dam to every
member of Congress. See Plater, supra note 22, at 813-14. Because the press frustratingly
failed to carry that part of the story, Congress ultimately felt free to ignore the merits and roll
the pork barrel, and Jimmy Carter, piteously apologizing, decided he could not counter the
ridicule attached to the press's version of the fish story. Id at 814 & n.33.
36. AFSEEE has noted numerous examples of Forest Service employees, particularly biologists, who got in trouble trying to do their jobs accurately while resisting the timber-oriented pressures within the agency hierarchy. Telephone Interview with Jeff DeBonis,
Founder, AFSEEE (Feb. 24, 1994) [hereinafter DeBonis Interview]. Internal agency reports
that demonstrated the validity of the citizen enforcers' complaints were lost in the bureaucracy
and only mysteriously made available to the citizens. See, e.g., Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 771 F. Supp. 1081 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
37. See Oliver A. Houck, With Charityfor All, 93 YALE L.J. 1415 (1984).
38. The Wise Users argue that the citizens in the forest controversy are "out in left field[,]
...the biggest hypocrites in the world .... making us a nation of naysayers." Julie Bailey,
Logger: Regain Control of Resources, LEWISTON MORNING TRIB., Oct. 25, 1991, at Al. The

Wise Use movement, cribbing its conservation label from Gifford Pinchot, who would not
appreciate the appropriation, represents the positions of subsidized industries and other interests chafing under changing public consciousness of resource issues. Its well-financed campaigns have attracted much ink, even though its message is self-serving and eschews analysis
on the merits, preferring to characterize environmentalists as analogs to Nazis and the like.
See, e.g., Charles P. Alexander, Gunningfor the Greens, TIME, Feb. 3, 1992, at 50.
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citizen lawsuit was carried into continuing cycles of judicial appeals and

remands. These were not unusual reactions. The only classic antienvironmental tactic missing from the old-growth story was a defensive

SLAPP suit-a "strategic lawsuit against public participation" countersuit seeking defamation damages and enjoining environmental
enforcement.39

And the timber industry's congressional representatives added section 318(g) to the 1989 appropriations bill.

Now let's consider section 318(g) on its terms. Leaving aside the
question of the appropriations bill vehicle,' as a matter of its legal function, section 318(g) is designed to prevent federal courts from granting

preliminary equitable relief in challenges against the most contested timber sales, which happen to involve the spotted owl. By the time a court is

able to hold
a permanent injunction hearing, it appears, the issue would
41
be moot.

But what is the provision's unspoken premise? Clearly its sponsors
wanted clear-cutting of public old-growth forests to continue unquestioned and unabated. Clearly they would have liked to override the conservation statutes that provide the forest advocates' legal ammunition,
but did not have the votes to do so.
The timber lobbyists and their congressional spokespersons realized,
however, that they did not have to repeal the statutes in order to nullify
the existing protective laws. All they had to do was block citizen enforcement actions. 2
Note the implicit premise, undoubtedly understood by all who

worked on the bill: Why would the timber lobbyists gain their objective
39. See NLS, supra note 6, at 121. Several SLAPP-like lawsuits were, however, filed for
interference with business profits owing to citizen demonstrations at clear-cutting sites.
DeBonis Interview, supra note 36.
40. Appropriations bills are theoretically prohibited from overriding substantive law, see
H.R. Doc. No. 279, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 608-627 (1987); S. Doc. No. 1, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. §§ 14-16 (1988), because of fears that bills in the appropriations process, the home of the
pork barrel, can circumvent substantive legislative committees and substantive criticism.
Courts typically construe appropriations riders narrowly. See Neal E. Devins, Regulation of
Government Agencies through Limitation Riders, 1987 DUKE L.J. 456. But if Congress violates its own rules by expressly passing a substantive rider on an appropriations bill, it will be
given effect. See Plater, supra note 22, at 843-44.
41. At the very least, litigating under shadow of the axe while timber program operations
continue is a shaky process.
42. Citizen plaintiffs are virtually the only people who use the courts to enforce federal
forest laws. This is taken for granted, but is interesting on its own terms. Decisions reporting
agency judicial enforcement actions are hard to find, which indicates either that the industry
feels it lacks the ability to object successfully against administrative enforcement or, more
likely, that it rarely has reason to object to administrative enforcement.
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if citizen suits were stymied? Because once citizen enforcement was removed, the industry and the Forest Service would be free to violate the
laws passed to regulate them, and would matter-of-factly continue doing

so. The purpose of section 318(g) was to allow both the industry and its
federal regulators to ignore the conservation laws. 43 The modem administrative state's only credible mechanism for seeing that these federal statutes were obeyed was public-interest litigation brought by citizen

volunteers. 44
Ultimately, the barrage of environmental lawsuits against clear-cut-

ting old-growth forests, although not stopping the clear-cutting, has
slowed it, and has brought the timber issue to the level of open national
policy debate. There has been extensive coverage from the national me-

dia, growing public awareness of some of the subtleties of the issue,
pointed congressional debates questioning the rationality of the subsidy
program, and a freshman President dragooned to the Pacific Northwest
to attempt a Timber Summit resolution of the matter.4 5 The statutory
exemption carried by section 318 has been removed from the books, in
part due to a petition to Congress signed by 458 law school deans and
faculty members protesting the provision. 46 New forest resource legisla-

tion is likely to follow up on the lessons of the spotted owl. 7 Jack Ward
43. This is not the only example of an appropriations provision designed to advance a
special interest through encouragement of lawbreaking. See WALTER GELLHORN ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 105 (7th ed. 1979) (noting Border Patrol budget cuts to encourage illegal
immigrant labor for Southwestern agriculture and cuts in labor inspector funding to weaken
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1993)).
44. That the rationale was not the avoidance of meritless litigation is indicated by the fact
that even in a field so subject to judicial deference to agency authority, there have been substantial numbers of injunctions issued in these citizen actions.
45. The Timber Summit, or Forest Conference as it was renamed, took place in Portland,
Oregon, on April 2, 1993. See Sher, supra note 32; Victor M. Sher, Key Results from Forest
Conference, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 16, 1993, at 18; see also U.S. FOREST SERV. &
BUREAU OF LIVESTOCK AND MINING, DRAFT SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT ON HABITAT FOR LATE SUCCESSIONAL AND OLDGROWTH FOREST RELATED
SPECIES WITHIN THE RANGE OF THE NORTHERN SPOTTED OWL (1993) (providing historical

narrative of clear-cutting progam and spotted owl).
The recently announced Clinton Administration compromise restricting old-growth logging to 693,000 acres of the total remaining 4.8 million unprotected acres of federal old-growth
forest does not please environmentalists, who had called for a complete cessation of the program. It does, however, accept their fundamental premise that the program is destructive and
requires curtailment. See Timothy Egan, Tight Logging Limit Set in Northwest, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 24, 1994, at A10.
46. Victor M. Sher & Carol Sue Hunting, Erodingthe Landscape, Erodingthe Laws: Congressional Exemptions from Judicial Review of Environmental Laws, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 435, 488-89 & n.270 (1991).
47. Congress has already overturned some old timber shibboleths, including the sweetheart long-term slash-and-burn timber contracts of the Tongass National Forest. Tongass

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:981

Thomas, the new head of the Forest Service, has issued a reformist

message to his staff in the field and in Washington that begins, "We will:
(1) Obey the law... [and] (2) [Iell the truth. ' 48 Whatever comes of it
all, can anyone seriously believe that this important national public pol-

icy debate would ever have happened without citizen environmental
litigation?
And the history of the old-growth clear-cutting battles illustrates
how environmental law has become a metaphor for fundamental changes
in the way American society makes its decisions.
III. AMERICA BEFORE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
It is not that there was no environmental law for the first 175 years
of the Republic, but rather that it was quite marginal, and citizens played

little organized part in its formation. What we now would identify as
environmental law lay in the interstices of the common law, principally
in the law of neighbors, in occasional regulatory provisions of local

health codes, or in statutes of the polite conservation variety. And it did
not yet have a name.

Under common law some cases that now would be called environmental were brought to court and successfully achieved remedies for pollution harms.49 Common law, however, created no consistent body of

case law recognizing the broad legitimacy of environmental protection,
and it often bowed matter-of-factly

to the national mission of

industrialization.5
Timber Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 101-626, §§ 101-103, 105(b), 104 Stat. 4426, 4426, 4427
(1990) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 539d (Supp. IV 1992)).
48. Memorandum from Jack Ward Thomas, Chief, U.S. Forest Service, to Deputy Chiefs,
National Foresters, Station Directors, Area Director, and TITF Director (Dec. 9, 1993) (on
file with author). He stated, "We will:
Obey the law.
Tell the truth.
Implement ecosystem management.
Develop new knowledge, synthesize research and apply it to management of natural
resources.
Build a Forest Service organization for the 21st century.
Trust and make full use of our hard-working, expert workforce."
49. See Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 101 N.E. 805 (N.Y. 1913) (holding pollution
of stream justified shutting down paper factory to protect farmer's water supply); Wilcox v.
Henry, 77 P. 1055 (Wash. 1904) (granting public nuisance injunction against rendering plant
smells).
50. See Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 258 N.Y.S. 229, 233 (App. Div. 1932) (holding no remedy for air pollution degradation of plaintiff's residence); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Sanderson, 6 A. 453, 459 (Pa. 1886) (holding riparians' common-law rights to unpolluted
water "must yield to the necessities of a great public industry"), overruled by Commonwealth
v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 319 A.2d 871 (Pa. 1974). Indeed, the fear of hindering economic
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In the years before the 1960s, the dominant players in American
governance were the marketplace and the government agencies that had
been delegated the function of market oversight. The economic marketplace has arguably always been the most powerful "government" of
American life, the true driving force of the Revolution that cut us off
from colonial rule and set us on our manifest destiny march of conquest
across the continent. Government did not readily leap to assume the role
of vigilant counterweight to the excesses of the marketplace.
In public law, with minor exceptions,5 1 early enactments in the natural resources field typically reflected the economic manifest destiny
principle. State and federal homestead, mining, and other resource exploitation acts focused on getting the resource base into the economy,
with virtually no conservation standards.5 2 Even after the geographical
frontier was no more, the frontier ethic of enterprise and exploitation,
ignoring the consequences or moving on-a systemic externalization of
costs-continued to be reflected in positive law.
The "unipolar" power structure,5 3 and the extreme laissez-faire paradigm of public government that served it, however, shifted in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to a more actively "bipolar"
model. Faced with trusts and corporations unknown to the Framers,
government agencies were occasionally given limited mandates to control
some of the most obvious excesses of unrestrained market power.5 4
In the environmental field the Forest Service, which was launched at
the turn of the century,55 was one of very few public regulatory agencies
designed to be an active protector of the nation's natural heritage. Even
in the New Deal's proliferation of agencies, in which the regulators in the
bipolar paradigm for a time actually took on very active planning and
development seems to have led many courts to adopt a general balance-of-utility defense so

that polluting defendants were virtually immune from tort prosecution. See NLS, supra note
6, at 114-15, 134-36.
51. See, e.g., Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 93-94 (1821) (holding right of public to fish in
stream notwithstanding objection by riparian owner).
52. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 22-39 (1988); see also, eg., Grand Canyon National Park Act, 16
U.S.C. § 224 (1988) (protecting homestead rights including mineral rights in creation of national park).
53. I think this concept derives from Richard B. Stewart's analysis in The Reformation of
American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975).
54. The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) was the first major federal regulatory
agency launched in 1897 by populist fervors but with powers that soon were co-opted by the
industry it regulated. See NLS, supra note 6, at 537-38.
55. See United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 522 (1911) (upholding Secretary of Agriculture's authority to restrict grazing on national forest lands).
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managerial roles, very few conservation regulations were passed.5 6 The

most successful area of environmental initiatives before the mid-twentieth century was undoubtedly the preservationist-conservationist ethic of
Teddy Roosevelt, Gifford Pinchot, and other silk-stocking mavericks.

Their movement, however, did not define or address environmental
threats broadly. National parks legislation, grand though it was, focused
on isolated niches of the American landscape, not on regulatory
objectives.5 7
Legislating public interest counterweights to marketplace power and
actually accomplishing a functioning balance between private and public
policy, moreover, turned out to be two very different propositions.
Although several regulation-oriented statutes were passed, they generally
amounted to very little in either the natural resource or pollution control
areas. Agencies like the Forest Service and the Grazing Service5 8 quickly
fell prey to the classic double-pronged counterattacking tactics of the
marketplace-strident resistance and seduction.5 9 Soon the powers and
perspectives of the industry they regulated effectively captured them.60
In the fields of air and water pollution control, a variety of statutory
systems appeared at both the federal and state level, but the same market
56. For example, the Soil Conservation Service that tamed the Dust Bowl did so primarily
through education and grants rather than regulation. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 590a to 590q-3 (1988).
57. The national park system, clearly a pioneering concept in resource protection, was
proprietary rather than regulatory and generally avoided treading too directly on market interests. Roosevelt and Pinchot epitomized the noblesse oblige Brahmin class and were far from
pluralist democratic antiestablishmentarians. William 0. Douglas, on the other hand, who
stood within the current of the conservation movement, targeted his interests and systemic
criticisms more broadly, including issues of pollution and urban quality of life.
58. The Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 was another early attempt to restrict resource derogation, designed to address the obvious destructive consequences of overgrazing on public lands.
43 U.S.C. §§ 315-316o (1988).
59. In 1892 the Attorney General under President Cleveland wrote to the president of a
railroad in response to the latter's plea for abolition of the ICC: "'The part of wisdom is not
to destroy the Commission, but to utilize it.'" Louis L. Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the
Administrative Process: A Reevaluation, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1109 n.7 (1954) (quoting
Richard Olney).
60. See George Cameron Coggins & Margaret Lindeberg-Johnson, The Law of Public
Rangeland Management II: The Commons and the Taylor Act, 13 ENVrL. L. 1, 11 (1982).
The U.S. Grazing Service along with the General Land Office became the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) in 1946, but the capture phenomenon continued, as shown by the BLM's
chronic jest name, Bureau of Livestock and Mining.
"We don't want to be a regulatory agency. We want to be a development agency on our
national lands," said former Secretary of Interior Manuel Lujan in a speech to coal industry
executives and a press conference thereafter, explaining why his department would continue to
refrain from strict enforcement of strip-mining regulations. Keith Schneider, U.S. Mine Inspectors Charge Interference by Agency Director, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 22, 1992, at Al.
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pressures sharply restricted the potential and practicability of their regulatory stringency. 1
The putative bipolar structure of societal governance, with official
governmental watchdogs guarding against market excesses, in practice
often evolved into a unipolar, laissez-faire love-nest, as the marketplace
co-opted the guardians. The legal profession did its part, developing an
expansive body of administrative law on behalf of industry, designed to
constrain and cut back the generally highhanded and much-resented potency of New Deal agencies. In 1946 the Administrative Procedures Act
(APA) 62 was pushed through Congress, saddling agencies with required
minimum standards of process to be given to regulated parties and providing for generous judicial review.
By 1955 the erstwhile opposing counterweights of the marketplace
and government had moved sufficiently close together that Henry Fairlie
could realistically dub them "the Establishment, ' 63 a sociopolitical
mechanism run by the official players, private and public, with no room
in the system for citizens.
In the environmental area the premise of private enterprise, generally seconded by the governmental regulators, was that maximizing direct economic net benefits to business was an unambiguous societal good,
with only the most egregious negative consequences and by-products deserving official attention as exceptions to the general rule. Environmental quality as well as other social costs were presumptive sacrificial tradeoffs. Needless to say, citizens were not welcomed as active players in the
environmental policy arena. The ongoing social balance was negotiated
within the two official blocs, government and industry. Concerns about
61. See NLS, supra note 6, at 722, 764-66, 827-28.
62. Ch. 324, §§ 1-12, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C. §§ 551-576 (1988)). Today, reflecting the contemporary reality of the regulator-regulated industry alliance, Justice Rehnquist has been able to read APA history upside down as
setting maximum procedural requirements when citizens attempt to win improved procedures
in court. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (holding that APA established maximum procedural requirements
Congress was willing to have courts impose on federal agencies in rule-making proceedings,
not just minimum procedures as previously thought).
63. Henry Fairlie may have borrowed the term from a predecessor, but it was he who
popularized it. See Henry Fairlie: Tribute to the Late Journalist,NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 26,
1990, at 6 (citing Henry Fairlie, THE SPECTATOR, (London, Sept. 23, 1955)). The phrase took
on some connotations of stridency in the post-1960s but clearly has useful denotative power.
Iron Triangles, I suppose, are more specific descriptive subsets of the Establishment.
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the natural environment were better left to the professional managers in
6
the field, corporate and governmental-even Aldo Leopold thought so.
IV.

THE REVOLUTION OF THE

1960s

Well, actually, in retrospect the 1960s did not totally end the patterns of the past and usher in the Age of Aquarius. The 1960s did, however, bring several remarkable and fundamental changes in theories of
social governance that have ultimately been reflected in the legal system,
most notably in environmental law.
In effect Rachel Carson spread a broad intellectual catch-basket beneath the Coasian welfare economists' universe of benefit-maximizing
individual actors, so as to collect and take overall account of their jettisoned "externalized" social costs, even if they are indirect and
unmarketized.65
Economics literature and Ronald Coase's 1960 article have clarified
some important elements of human behavior generally, including the nature of humans in economic enterprises and in government agencies.6 6
The fundamental perception was that all individual decision makers will
attempt to maximize the amount of benefits they can internalize to themselves, by externalizing the maximum related and consequential costs
onto others who will not be able to hold them accountable. Optimistically, like many economists, Coase thought that externalities could be
marketized and privately ordered, so that the marketplace would nevertheless achieve overall optimal choices without requiring the artifices of
governmental control. 67 His description of the problem, however, has
been more useful than his optimistic solution. Private profit-seeking
64. Although Leopold's A Sand County Almanac was a lyric scientific expansion of John
Muir's early twentieth-century natural ethics, Leopold was very much a professional resource
manager, generally aiming his writings at his colleagues rather than the public at large.
65. There is no such word as "unmarketized," but it is a useful term for denoting consequences that do not traditionally or conveniently have a monetary or political market value,
but which nevertheless have societal importance.
66. See Coase, supra note 1, at 3-5, 42-44. The human-nature calculus described by economists for individuals in the marketplace also describes the individual calculus of agency decision makers: A public official deciding whether to dream up a massive public works project to
dam a river, drain a wetland, or build a hundred miles of lumber roads into wilderness does
not have to pay for the resources. They are already owned by government or can be paid for
with taxpayer dollars, which likewise are effectively free to the Iron Triangle. Losses of natural values are traditionally costless. Agencies feel internal benefits in terms of power-political
heft and ability to spend budgets-and their institutional momentum. Zygmunt J.B. Plater,
Reflected in a River: Agency Accountability and the TVA Tellico Dam Case, 49 TENN. L. REV.
747, 754-55 (1982).

67. This requires heroic assumptions about measurability of consequences, as well as perfect information, no transaction costs, and no disparate access to markets or disparate re-
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mechanisms are so powerful, the receiving commons so diffuse and hard
to monitor, and the brokerage system required to trade in social costs so
difficult to conceive, that the old bipolar players have been largely able to
continue their business as usual. Social costs continue to be generated
and accumulate in clouds of vastly troublesome externalizations. Private
corporate decision makers and public agency officials still often operate
as if in an insulated sphere, ignoring the detritus and accumulated interacting consequences of their actions.
Rachel Carson showed that predictable systemic problems follow
when official players make decisions in traditional terms, looking with a
narrowed field of vision at short-term benefits and one-shot technological
horizons. You got bugs? Go spray a pesticide. Zap. Now you've got
what you wanted. Dead bugs. The end.
Carson taught that this is not all that happens. There is no such
thing as a simple, one-shot technology; everything has continuing longterm consequences. Pesticides do not just kill target bugs, they kill many
of their ecological neighbors as well, eliminating the rich, stable equilibrium that had naturally evolved to give the land its fertility in the first
place.6" Pesticides do not just disappear after they have killed the target
bugs. They linger on and on, blowing in the wind, leaching into groundwater, moving up through ecological food chains. The lessons Carson
drew from DDT pesticides, moreover, readily applied themselves to
many other settings as well-not only to other kinds of pollution, but
also to resource management issues like timber and grazing, to highway
and transportation planning, pharmaceuticals and health technology,
and by extension to many other areas of national policy.6 9 Although
humans may not take account of the true social and ecological costs of
their actions, nature keeps a comprehensive tab, and real consequences
follow.70
sources. See Coase, supra note 1, at 15-16; Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental
Law: A Normative Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562 (1992).
68. See CARSON, supra note 1, at 54-57, 61. It is remarkable in retrospect how books
written by three women at virtually the same historical moment so powerfully reshaped so
much of modem American society's view of life: RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962);
JANE JACOB, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (1961); and BETTY

FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963).
69. Without casting the proposition so universally as to be meaningless, the crux of Carson's logical reminder of the need to account comprehensively for consequences direct and
indirect, positive and negative, obviously holds logical significance for current debates about
industrial policy, immigration, welfare, and indeed virtually all human decision making.
70. When there is uncertainty about the scale of consequences, ecology also teaches the
precautionary principle-that we should disrupt as little as possible the long-evolved diversity
and equilibrium we inherited.

100
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Rachel Carson's paradigm also changed the scope and hierarchy of
the perceptual landscape we apply to human actions. King Canute
notwithstanding, Western societies have traditionally tended to view
human actors as the central players in the life of the planet, with nature
as a subservient and pliant backdrop. 7 1 Carson showed through the ecological realm that the backdrop to human activity may be far larger in
scale and importance than the humans pirouetting in the foreground.
Nature has developed a richly diverse and interacting natural equilibrium, communities of communities spread around the planet providing
services previously unrecognized, fulfilling important productive functions previously taken for granted, capable of causing broadly destructive
systemic consequences when they are jostled out of balance. 2
From this perspective an important utilitarian precautionary principle asserted itself: Unless you are pretty sure that the background foundational equilibria will not be disrupted, or that the negative
consequences will be foreseeable, minor, and mitigatable, you had better
be sure that what you propose to do is worth the potential costs; it is
safer not to risk casually the escalating domino consequences that may
follow.73 In this regard Carson showed that moving from a human-centered, master-of-nature perspective to the holistic, human-species-as-constituent-part-of-nature view is not just an ethical idea, it is fundamentally
practical and utilitarian as well.
Silent Spring, an essentially scientific disquisition, found a remarkably broad, energetic, and engaged public audience. In the 1960s citizens
had suddenly begun to discover themselves, thanks to the civil rights
71. See NLS, supra note 6, at 12-13.
72. A homely example is Carson's discussion of the crucial role of diverse soil bacteria and
earthworms in creating and maintaining soil fertility. Once the soil is poisoned by pesticides
over vast areas, exterminating or drastically reducing these ecological chains, humans must try
to replicate the natural pest-control and nutrient-investment cycles. To do this artificially, it
turns out, is expensive and not very successful. See CARSON, supra note 1, at 55-56, 107-08,
253-55.
Another vivid extension of Carson's bacteria and earthworm analysis is the human urge
to dam flowing water. The Aswan Dam and others like it are huge, dramatic edifices ultimately dwarfed by their prosaic natural consequences: little snail-borne schistosomes killing
and maiming tens of thousands of valley residents; little grains of sediment, deposited by the
trillions, clogging reservoirs and blocking turbines, causing the washing away of thousands of
acres of downstream valley lands and coastline, and cutting off nutrient flows to maritime
fishing industries; and so on. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Multi-LateralLending Banks, Environmental Diseconomies, and the InternationalLending Process: The Example of Third World
Dams, 9 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 169 (1989).
73. The precautionary principle has lately achieved international recognition, emerging as
a major international policy norm. See The Rio Declarationon Environment and Development,
princ. 15, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151/5 (1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration](advocating alternatives to chemical control of insects).
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movement, Vietnam, Ralph Nader's consumerism, and the media.7 4 By
the end of the 1960s, environmental consciousness had percolated sufficiently as a popular phenomenon and it flooded into the national political
process, not as a typical American single-issue reform movement but as a
new way of reacting to a wide array of issues.7" Environmental problems

were broadly energizing.76 They turned out not only to be in everyone's
backyard, but also were perceptibly linked to ever-broader levels of envi-

ronmental issues, with analogs to a wide array of other social problem
areas as well. The citizens grabbed Silent Spring and ran with it. Some

ran to the newspapers, some to communes, some to legislatures.
But the center of momentum for the first wave of environmental law
clearly went to the courts, using preexisting common and statutory law.

In lawsuits filed by environmentally conscious citizens, private nuisance
actions became more common in the pollution. setting; the public nuisance action grew beyond its traditional settings; the public trust doctrine
was rediscovered and applied to complex resource controversies; and attempts were made to retarget statutes like the 1899 Rivers and Harbors
Act. 77 Even when these early citizen activists chose to try legislative ac74. The debt to the civil rights movement, Vietnam, and Ralph Nader is undeniable.
These pioneered the pluralism of people power, citizen-policy analysis, and public interest
shadow government, and showed how to open the newsroom and courthouse doors. I would
argue that environmental law has achieved a different level of complexity and power, however,
because unlike these predecessor initiatives it is not focused on an issue, but rather on the
much-broader terrain of the Rachel Carson Paradigm's analytical construct.
Why did these phenomena happen in the 1960s? Perhaps because of prosperity, education, a mid-century sense of a need for overall assessment of where we were going, and, of
course, because the media had given Americans such vivid new perspectives of themselves as a
continental village.
75. Even Richard Nixon was impressed enough with the political appeal of environmentalism that he tentatively proposed a Clean Air Act amendment setting a moratorium deadline on
the production of internal combustion engine cars! Nixon said, "The 1970's must be the years
when America pays its debts to the past by reclaiming the purity of its air, its water, and our
living environment. It is literally now or never." This quote is taken from a poster created in
1973 by the Committee to Re-elect the President.
76. Alexis de Tocqueville noted how Americans flocking to single-issue reforms energized
the democratic process. 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 106-07 (Vin-

tage Books 1990) (1840).
The remarkable diversity of "environmental" issues emphasizes that this "movement" is
united not by discrete subject matter but by its way of looking at things. See NLS, supra note
6, at 3. Environmentalism, despite its typical.media manifestations, is not just a collection of
anecdotes, but a systemic analytical approach. The widespread utility of the Rachel Carson
Paradigm also explains why environmentalism did not fade away as the fad it initially was so
widely cracked up to be.
77. Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, ch. 425, §§ 1,7, 9-20, 30 Stat. 1148, 1150-55 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.). On the uses of private and public nuisance, see
NLS, supra note 6, at 102-30. On public trust, see id. at 365-412. On extensions of the Refuse
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1988), see NLS, supra note 6, at 322-27. The critical role played by the
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tion-notably in the Michigan Environmental Protection Act of 1970,
authored by Professor Joseph Sax 7 m-the statutory approach was to facilitate citizens' environmental standing in court, and the creation of new
common law in the public nuisance-public trust areas.
Then began the parade of regulatory statutes over the next several
years the like of which we probably will never see again, virtually all
driven by popular political fervor 7 9-the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969,80 the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 (CAA),8s the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,82 the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act,83 the Noise Control Act of 1972,84 the Clean Water Act of 1977
(CWA),8 1 the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972,86 and more than
two dozen more.87 In the years that have followed, the scope and
number of environmental statutes have continued to grow.
media cannot be underestimated; much of the early media climate, however, was focused on
environmental lawsuits.
78. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 691.1201-.1207 (West 1970). A number of other states
adopted this Act as a model. See NLS, supra note 6, at 420-24. This pioneering statute was
sponsored by a federation of garden clubs in western Michigan, later the West Michigan Environmental Action Council. See also JOSEPH L. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A
STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTION (1970) for a book that directly inspired citizen environmentalism in the 1970s.
79. Indeed Congress passed significant federal statutes prior to the late 1960s, including
most notably the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); the Parklands Act, 46 U.S.C. § 1653(0(4)(F) (1988), 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1988); and the Wild and Scenic
Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1281-1287 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Each of these, however, was
relatively adjectival and circumscribed in effective scope and less the product of wide popular
appeal than the back-chamber pressure from the midcentury remnants of the early conservation movement, motivated by a rarefied noblesse. This is not to take away from those important and dramatic accomplishments, but rather to note that they were less a function of the
new post-Silent Spring paradigm shifts.
80. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 43214370d (West 1985 & Supp. 1993)).
81. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
82. Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988
& Supp. IV 1992)).
83. Pub. L. No. 73-121, 48 Stat. 401 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-661c
(1988)).
84. Pub. L. No. 92-574, 86 Stat. 1234 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901-4918
(1988)).
85. Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387
(West 1986 & Supp. 1993)).
86. Pub. L. No. 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
87. By my count there were 34 important environmental statutes passed in the three years
after NEPA. See ZYGMUNT PLATER ET AL., NATURE, LAW, & SOCIETY TEACHER'S MANUAL 358-60 (1992) (historical statutory appendix). Only Jimmy Carter's years come close,
with 20 in an equivalent span, many of which were perfecting amendments. Id. at 360-62.
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These modem statutory systems wittingly or unwittingly reflected
Rachel Carson's teachings, addressing ecological and economic values
and problems that had not been acknowledged or had been inadequately
accounted for in previous public and private law, targeting public as well
as private enterprises.
NEPA, which figured in the spotted owl litigation, is a prime example. NEPA, whether or not Congress understood what it was doing
when it passed the bill, reflected the critically important common-sense
decisional principle that, like individuals, government agencies should
consider all relevant options and consequences before they acted.8 8
The pollution statutes created comprehensive federal standards and
processes for monitoring and enforcing corporate compliance with
them-perhaps the most wide-ranging, voluminous, intricately intensive
regulation of human enterprise in our history.8 9 Planning statutes have
attempted to require rational overall programming to guide public and,
to a much lesser extent, private decision making. Other statutes focusing
on wildlife and endangered species, workplace health, and particular
zones of environmental disruption like coastal areas, similarly have attempted to acknowledge systematic problems that previously had not
been viewed systematically.
The development of environmental law has been dramatic-a massive upwelling of layer upon layer of substantial public and private law
doctrines, almost volcanic in the power and mass of its eruption since the
early 1960s.
Today, the extraordinary sweep of subject matter coverage subsumed under the rubric "environmental law" can be attributed to the
universality of the Carson Paradigm. Consider environmentalism's
amazing subject matter diversity: It includes chemical wastes buried in
suburban fields; seal puppies clubbed to death on floating ice packs; uranium fuel rods shipped overseas to nuclear power plants; toxic chemical
threats to vulnerable neighborhoods in Italy, India, and Georgia; issues
of environmental justice for low-income neighborhoods and communities
of color; the imminent extinction of various endangered species; commercialization of national parks; pork-barrel dam building; historical preservation; developing-nation rain forests and desertification; rat bites and
88. It is likely that Congress did not know what it was doing, see NLS, supra note 6, at
600-01, but that does not change the importance of its implicit strategy, which has subsequently been copied far and wide as a basic construct of rational decision making, id. at 600.
89. The Internal Revenue Code and regulations, for instance, have less intensive day-today application to industrial production activity and are lesser in bulk than the statutory and
regulatory provisions of the CAA, CWA, and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6992k (West 1983 & Supp. 1993).
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lead poisoning in urban slums; chlorofluorocarbons thinning stratospheric ozone; global warming; and hundreds more.9"
All of these widely diverse situations are "environmental" issues,
and "environmentalists" have taken legal action on each of them-and
hundreds of others--over the past few decades with varying degrees of
success.9" Rachel Carson's perceptions of comprehensive interconnectedness in ecological science quite naturally invited a similar comprehensive accounting beyond the biophysical sphere of environmentacknowledging historical, aesthetic, hedonic, spiritual, communitarian,
ethical, quality-of-life values. These too have become "ecological" values
in the sense of a larger "human ecology"-as real as and far more widespread than pesticide residues.
V.

THE ARRIVAL OF THE PLURALISTIC PARADIGM

The 1960s marked a second fortuitous and dramatic shift in paradigm that launched environmental law: the emphatic arrival of active
pluralistic participation in the structures of governance. "Never doubt
that a small group of ... committed citizens can change the world: indeed, it's the only thing that ever has," Margaret Mead said; 92 and the
1960s generation took heed.
The most dramatic expansion of new environmental law, the statutory parade beginning in 1970, would have amounted to very little without the extraordinary advent of effective political pluralism in the mid1960s, most obvious in the new openness of the courts to citizen public
interest litigation.
In public law litigation the key was that federal courts allowed citizens to hijack the old bipolar administrative law. The structure of procedural constraints on agencies backed by expanded doctrines of judicial
review-designed by regulated industry over the first half of the century
to rein in high-handed bureaucracies-was now turned by citizen outsid90. See NLS, supra note 6, at 2-3.
91. Each case involves a highly individualized set of scientific facts, economic and political
issues, and social and natural consequences. Many have no obvious connection with others on
the list, other than an environmental label. The different areas have become so voluminously
complex that an expert working on water pollution law, for example, typically has no time to
do anything else. A person studying the science and law of endangered plants may have no
special knowledge of any other environmental area, and no ties to individuals working on other
kinds of environmental cases. Given this diversity, the term "environmental" may seem uselessly broad, describing nothing in particular. At worst, the environmental label can give each
of these situations a quixotic implication that may serve to detract from serious public consideration of the merits, although this is changing. But the Carson Paradigm links them all.
92. Barbara Dority, Civil Liberties Watch: Compassion in Dying, THE HUMANIST, July-

Aug. 1993, at 25, 26 (quoting Margaret Mead).
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ers against the industry-agency establishment itself. Circuit court deci-

sions like Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power

Commission93 in 1966 led to Supreme Court cases like Citizens to Pre-

serve Overton Park,Inc. v. Volpe in 1971. 91 These cases established the
standing of citizens to demand the same access to agencies and courts,
and the same procedural treatment, as the more established "legitimate"

bipolar players.
Even more, the courts showed a willingness to give citizens expanded recognition as "private attorneys general" attempting to enforce

federal law when the official players would not-and when indeed they
were often the defendants. As Warren Burger, no bleeding-heart liberal,

wrote in a case in which the agency and industry had built a wall against
citizen intervention in the administrative process, "[I]ntervenors representing a public interest [should not] be treated as interlopers ....
[A]
public intervenor is seeking no license or private rights.... The public
intervenors, who were performing a public service... were entitled to a

more hospitable reception in the performance of that function."9
When citizen environmentalists attempt to vindicate the public interest against well-heeled corporate adversaries, an agency should not
"act as an umpire blandly calling balls and strikes ... ; the right of the
public must receive active and affirmative protection." 96 Starting with
Calvert Cliffs Coordination Committee v. United States Atomic Energy
Commission, NEPA cases epitomized this dramatic takeover. NEPA
was, remember, a statute addressed to agencies themselves, with textual
mention of enforcement limited to the President and Congress, and a

very conscious exclusion of any hint of citizen litigation from its terms.98
Yet the courts matter-of-factly proceeded to interpret NEPA to create a

cause of action, and citizens have been its sole practical enforcement.
93. 354 F.2d 608, 615 (2d Cir. 1965) (holding that statute may create new interests and
rights, thus giving standing). See also Office of Communication of the United Church of
Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966), appeal after remand, 425 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir.
1969), which was not a traditional environmental case, but felt like one.
94. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). Overton Park was followed by United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973), and Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
95. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543, 546,
548-49 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
96. Scenic Hudson, 354 F.2d at 620.
97. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Calvert Cliffs was perhaps the most dramatic early
legal showdown between the old industrial-regulatory establishment and the new Carson consciousness employed by citizen groups.
98. NEPA's legislative history clearly demonstrates congressional intent to exclude the
spectre of citizen lawsuits. See RICHARD N.L. ANDREWS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND
ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGE 13 (1976); NLS, supra note 6, at 600-01.
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The pluralist shift was reflected in statutes regulating internal
agency procedures as well. The Freedom of Information Act9 9 turned
official information policy on its head, providing for a presumption of
disclosure with severely limited exceptions. 1°° The government in the
Sunshine Act 0 1 sought to open the windows of closed-door meetings
long dominated by good-ol'-boy inside players.
But the most significant statutory symptom of the pluralist paradigm shift was the explosion of congressionally created citizen enforcement provisions. Drawing on the experience of the civil rights era, the
drafters of dozens of new and amended environmental statutes 0 2 realized that hopes for reliable enforcement required the efforts of citizen
attorneys general. In a quintessentially American move-now being cop3
ied by European and other international legal systemsl°0-these
statutes
gave citizens standing to enforce federal law upon filing a sixty-day notice letter."° Fee-shifting provisions further encouraged citizen enforce99. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).

100. Id. § 552 (1988). Prior law reflected the bipolar Establishment position; requested information was presumed not to be disclosed.
101. Id § 552b. The Sunshine Act has been underwhelming in its effectiveness. See FCC
v. ITT World Communications, 466 U.S. 463, 473 (1984).
102. See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2618(d), 2619 (1988 & Supp. IV
1992); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1988); Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1270(d) (1988); Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, id. § 1427(c); Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(d) (West 1986);
Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(4) (1988);
Deepwater Port Act of 1974, id. § 1515(d); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(d)
(1988); Noise Control Act of 1972, id. § 4911(d); Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, id.
§ 5851(e)(2); Energy Policy and Conservation Act, id. § 6305(d) (1988); Solid Waste Disposal
Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6972(e) (West 1983 & Supp. 1993); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7604,
7607(0 (West 1988 & Supp. III 1991); Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, 42
U.S.C. § 8435(d) (1988); Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Act of 1980, id. § 9124(d); Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a)(5) (1988); see also MARY DERFNER & ARTHUR WOLF, COURT AWARDED ATTORNEYS FEES (1983).
103. Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration reads:
Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned
citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have appropriate access to information concerning the environment that is held by public authorities, including information on hazardous materials and activities in their
communities, and the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes. States
shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by making information widely available. Effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided.
Rio Declaration,supra note 73, princ. 10.
104. Statutory standing, of course, is subject to some further Article III and court-made
strictures that have hindered the citizen enforcement process. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992); Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990); Cass R.
Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article III, 91 MicH.
L. REv. 163 (1992).
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ment by allowing citizen plaintiffs who prevailed in whole or part to
0
recover expert witness and attorneys fees.0'
The rationale for encouraging citizen enforcement litigation,
though obvious, deserves spelling out. It reflects the conjunction of the
two paradigms. Public policy had evolved to recognize values and decisional contexts that obstructed or overturned preexisting institutional
norms. To rely on the existing bipolar institutions for zealous application of the new standards and procedures was to ask too much of institutional self-interest and good-ol'-boy human nature. Rachel Carson's
Paradigm was too threatening to established habits and alliances. Citizen outsiders who understood the new paradigm and were willing to take
on the burdens of volunteer pluralism were a structural necessity if reform was to be brought into the system over the passive or active resistance of the old insiders. As in the Forest Service clear-cutting cases, if
citizens did not enforce the law, no one would.
Citizen litigation shaped most of the modern administrative structure of environmental law every step of the way, from NEPA as a tangible procedural requirement to the most intricate question of how air
pollution offset credits can be brokered in interstate transfers, in'a vast
swath of law-building.10 6 Citizen environmentalists have evolved a remarkable range of pluralistic organizations, many with marked sophistication in science, policy analysis, communication, and politics, as well as
legal skills. With so much environmental law on the books and so many
environmental practitioners in the modem bar, 0 7 environmental law and
environmentalism will never again be marginal.
VI. A SUMMARY PERSPECTIVE
This Essay argues that environmental law is a special kind of field,
born on the cusp of a particularly significant moment in American social
history. Environmental law is not a single issue, not a single area of law.
105. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1988). The Equal Access to Justice Act added a general
authorization for fee recovery in successful suits against federal agency defendants. Id.; see
Reuben B. Robertson & Mary Candace Fowler, Recovering Attorneys' Fees from the Government under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 56 TUL. L. REv. 903 (1982).
106. One cannot understand the legal development of major command and control regulatory systems like the Clean Air Act without knowing the role played by NGOs and their
attorneys, like Natural Resources Defense Council's David Doniger and Rick Ayres. The
primary exception to the primacy of citizen litigation is probably the field of toxics regulation,
in which agency initiative has built most of the doctrine not so much in response to citizen
litigation as to the astonishing and somewhat anomalous popular political revulsion against
toxic contamination.
107. By the early 1980s according to the Environmental Law Institute's Bill Futrell, the
number of attorneys practicing environmental law exceeded the number practicing labor law.
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It sprang in the 1960s from the confluence of two fundamental societal
paradigm shifts, two new ways of looking at the world. The Rachel Carson Paradigm was a decisional analytical construct charting the basic
necessity and logic of comprehensive accounting of foreseeable costs and
benefits, even if they are indirect and unmarketized. The Pluralist Paradigm of the mid-1960s marked the beginning of a shift from an exclusively bipolar model of governance-in which government agencies were
entrusted with the task of counter-balancing regulated market forces-to
a multipolar model with active participation by many interested outsiders. The environmental law pluralism that emerged from the confluence
of the two is a political process antidote to the fact that the older bipolar
cost-externalizing social structures, private and public, have massively
resisted the new wisdom.
If the proposition advanced in this Essay has merit, it permits several interesting analytical extensions that are beyond the limits of this
present Symposium format. Why in the course of the past twenty-five
years has environmental law grown so far beyond pure ecology to include
so many social, economic, political, and technological areas, instead of
quickly dying out as a single-issue fad as initially predicted? Why has
environmental law spread its tendrils so ubiquitously throughout the
legal system, instead of just remaining a cozy green corner of the law
school curriculum? Why is environmentalism often so erratic, jerrybuilt, and confrontational? Why is it that the procedures, structures, and
players of environmental law so often turn up in other active areas of
national governance? If pluralism is functionally important, why is it so
undernourished and resisted? And where do we go from here-toward
sustainable economics and ecological balance, or not? The proposition of
shifting paradigms can help answer these questions.
If the fundamental perceptions of environmentalism are correctthat human decisions do generally tend to ignore cumulative negative
consequences, but everything is connected to everything else so we need a
decisional system that integrates considerations of the whole-then
much of the development of environmental law over the last several decades becomes in retrospect a laboratory of these paradigms, and a harbinger of the future.

